consists in facing this discovery in order to find within it the source of existential transformation.

« 14 » At the same time, these existential implications have repercussions on a theoretical level, loosening the "grasping attitude" that is at the basis of the search for an absolute metaphysical ground beyond the all-pervasive impermanence and emptiness of phenomena. Michel Bitbol (2008, 2012) refers to this crucial aspect of Varela's view as the "Varelian" or "neurophenomenological" stance.[3] This stance leads us to dissolve the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness (Chalmers 1995), by dismantling the foundationalist attitude that gives rise to it (see Bitbol & Antonova 2016: 355, Vörös 2014: 104) and by experiencing the dissolution of the subject-object duality (Petitmengin 2017: 145). In my opinion, this existential stance is a crucial component of Varela's radical proposal and constitutes a further dimension of its way of embodying and opening up cognitive science.

Andrea Pace Giannotta obtained his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Florence in 2016. His main topics of investigation encompass phenomenology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception. His research focuses on genetic phenomenology, 4E cognition, neurophenomenology and phenomenal intentionality.

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3 | The Varelian stance also leads us to highlight the anti-foundationalist and anti-metaphysical orientation of the original enactive approach of *EM*, in contrast to some contemporary forms of "domesticated enactivism" (Vörös, Froese & Riegler 2016: 198) that are characterized by a "*shift towards realism*" (ibid: 194).

On the Second-Person Method: Considering the Diversity and Modes of Subjects's Descriptions

Susanne Ravn
University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
sravn/at/health.sdu.dk

> Upshot • Varela's description of how first-, second- and third-person positions are inserted in a network of social exchange forms a central ground for using a second-person position as a mediator in a phenomenological exploration of lived experiences. Based on Martiny's arguments that we should expand the notion of the lab, I suggest that the fundamental circularity of the scientist and the first-person experiences investigated needs to be considered in an extended form when involving a second-person method taking place in the conditions of the world of everyday life.

« 1 » Kristian Martiny's target article about ways to conduct cognitive science does not only present a very welcome overview of Francisco Varela's proposals on how to open up and develop the way in which cognitive science is performed. He also, in the second part of the article, argues for how to use interviews – or "second-person methods" to generate descriptions of experiences as lived. As my own research is based in the interdisciplinary field(s) of combining short-term ethnographical fieldwork/qualitative research methodologies with phenomenological analysis, in the following, I will primarily focus on outlining interdisciplinary considerations related to the latter part of Martiny's article. Drawing on the manner in which first-, second- and third-person positions are described as inserted in a network of social exchange – and change – in Varela and Jonathan Shear's article (1999), I will specifically focus on how the use of the second-person position constructively mediates explorations of the circulation that unfold between first- and third-person descriptions of phenomena. I will argue that if the purpose of a second-person method is to contribute to the promotion of new and sustainable forms of collaboration (as claimed in §1), the fundamental circularity of the scientist and the investigation of lived experience need to be considered in an extended form that:

- involves methodological considerations on how the samples of the "cases" (the subject's experiences of a phenomenon/class of phenomenon) are selected and how relational conditions of the interview situation are handled;
- clarifies the different communicative modes that can be at play when opening up the lab to involve the lived experiences of subjects in a direct and/or performative way.

« 2 » Firstly, Martiny presents an informative account of how Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Elanor Rosch (VTR) (1991) find it necessary to go back to the particularity of experiences as embodied and lived by the subject. Subsequently, he argues for the necessity of expanding the notion of the lab and involving explorations of phenomena as they unfold in and as part of the world of everyday life. In that sense, Varela's insistence on including thorough exploration of first-person methodologies in cognitive sciences is aimed at being radically extended by involving the second-person method of interviewing. Pursuing this aim, Martiny, however briefly, makes a reference to Bent Flyvbjerg's work. Without embarking on a further description of Flyvbjerg's methodological discussions, it seems fair to ask for considerations of the *strategies of the enquiry* when dealing with "the detailed examination of a single example (or case) of a class of phenomena" (Flyvbjerg 2011: 301). Flyvbjerg very explicitly connects the characteristics of the *design* of such a study to how the different types of design influence the way results of analysis can be interpreted and contribute to general theoretical knowledge. Absolutely central to his work, and of specific relevance for the ambition of combining the second-person method with phenomenological analysis, is that Flyvbjerg presents four different strategies related to the information-oriented selection of cases (all quotes are from Flyvbjerg 2011: 307):

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■ Paradigmatic cases – which are specifically selected to develop "a metaphor or establish a school" for the phenomenon that the case concerns;

■ Critical cases – which are specifically selected "to achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type 'if this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases'";

■ Maximum variation cases – which are selected to "obtain information about the significance of various circumstances" as related to and defining the case;

■ Extreme or deviant cases – which are selected to obtain descriptions of cases that are specifically unusual or specifically good in a more closely defined sense. These cases are often intended to challenge the limits of existing theories.

« 3 » The lived experiences of subjects are thereby, as *cases* of lived experience, placed from the onset among a diversity of lived experiences of the phenomenon under investigation. Accordingly, drawing on Flyvbjerg's considerations on the case-study design, a subject living with, for example, cerebral palsy (CP) is not *ipso facto* to be considered a paradigmatic case of what it means to live with CP, but rather to be thoroughly considered, in a methodological sense, a case among other cases of CP.

« 4 » If we want to follow Martiny and take Varela's work outside the lab and engage with subjects in the world of everyday life, we need to acknowledge that the epistemological necessity of understanding the fundamental circularity of conducting cognitive science demands considerations that reach beyond the interactions unfolding in the interview situation. With reference to Flyvberg's work, I find it essential to remember that the circularity of knowledge generation is *also* to be recognised as forming part of a wider circularity of how cases become identified as cases in the world of everyday life. In accordance with Varela and Shear (1999), Martiny (§§49–55) specifically emphasises that the interviewees' descriptions unfold in the dynamic conditions of the interview and that the validation should be considered an intersubjective practice. Considerations on the authority of the researcher and the role that the authority inevitably plays in the interview situation are, however, not touched upon. The

interviewer's skillset as a social mediator (§59) is undoubtedly important to how the interviewees revisit and partly relive their experiences, but if we want to understand thoroughly the complexities of how the circularity unfolds in a second person-method of interviewing, we also need to consider the framing of the interview as constituting a research interview. Such considerations would, in more concrete terms, include reflections on which words and concepts come into use during the interview – especially who presents central concepts and themes and on which premises these are presented (e.g., Ravn & Hansen 2013; He & Ravn 2017). In other words, the social dimension of this fundamental circularity is to be more actively considered. Concretely, the second-person position of the researcher demands further methodological considerations aside the active preparation of being able to take the role of "a coach or a midwife" empathically resonating the interviewee's experiences (Varela & Shear 1999: 10).

« 5 » Until now, such considerations have been surprisingly absent not only in Varela and Shear's descriptions of how the interviewer, from a second-person position, interprets the "traces and manifestations of mental life" of the interviewee (Varela & Shear 1999: 10) and in Martiny's article, but also in related articles specifically arguing for using the qualitative interview for phenomenological analysis (e.g., Gallagher & Francesconi 2012; Høffding & Martiny 2016). While understanding the fundamental importance of Varela's clarifications of the mediating possibility of the second-person position, I suggest that socially related conditions should be given further consideration in the continuous ambition of opening up cognitive sciences.

« 6 » Martiny presents different projects in which he has actively worked with the conditions that constitute the lab. I have the deepest respect for his wide engagement, and not least competence to engage across different academic and artistic fields. Few dare and are able to deal with the methodological risk such projects demand. That said, I am also a bit sceptical about how the manifestations of lived experiences are – so to say – put into performance in the projects presented.

« 7 » I have no doubt of the relevance and importance of exploring and possibly constructively changing people's attitudes to physical disability (like CP) in the world of everyday life through the project of a theatre performance. However, it is not clear to me how the theatre performance, which focuses on presenting a life with CP, relates to the interests of cognitive science? As the project is presented, however briefly, the staging of CP and the questionnaires to the audience seem rather to be related to the domains of cultural analyses and social sciences. For example, analyses concerning stigmatisation (e.g., Goffman 1986) and our pragmatic way of living our lives as storytellers (e.g., Bruner 1990).

« 8 » More importantly, however, opening up the lab to include theatre performances demands thorough considerations of the relation between the descriptions of experiences as presented during interviews and the manifestation of experiences performed on a stage. A theatre performance in which CP is orchestrated in the conditions of the theatre is hardly "just" to be considered another manifestation of the very same experience – as is explicitly discussed with reference to Zahavi in §52. The theatre performance does not "just" present a different manifestation of the same experience. Rather, in the process of creating a performance, the descriptions of lived experiences become transformed so that they can be communicated in the specific conditions of the theatre. In that sense, the presentation of lived experience changes modus. This kind of interdisciplinary cooperation specifically demands us to present a clearer understanding of the difference between descriptions generated in the condition of the interview versus the processed version of the interview used for communicating the descriptions as a result.

« 9 » Varela opened the door to constructively connecting cognitive science to first-person methodologies. In the first part of *The Embodied Mind*, VTR argue that even the most hard-core biologist would have to admit that there are many ways in which the world is "depending on the structure of the being involved and the kind of distinction it is being able to make" (1991: 9). In order to engage in second-person methods outside the lab we are required to expand our meth-

odological understanding of how to handle the diversity of lived experiences not only across biological species, but also across physical, cultural and social conditions. Presenting an enactive phenomenology in the latter part of the book, VTR specifically point out that perception also contributes to the enactment of the surrounding world (ibid: 172–175). Our experiences of colour and smell are not passive mappings of external features, but present a "creative form of enacting significance on the basis of the animal's embodied history" (ibid: 175). To involve second-person methods outside the lab forces us to take this aspect of Varela's description of the enactive approach more actively into consideration when dealing with the complexity of intersubjective validation. As indicated in this commentary on Martiny's article, we are methodologically challenged to re-investigate how we may bring first- and second-person positions into active dialogue when generating descriptions – a challenge first pointed out, and constructively clarified in, the work of Varela.

Susanne Ravn is an associate professor and head of the research unit, Movement, Culture and Society, at the Department of Sports Science and Biomechanics at the University of Southern Denmark. In her research, she critically explores the embodied insights of different movement practices and actively deals with the interdisciplinary challenges of employing phenomenological thinking in the analysis of these practices.

Author's Response
Degrees of Openness, Embodiment, Circularity, and Invariance

Kristian Moltke Martiny

> **Upshot** · I clarify Varela's radical proposal by discussing different degrees of "openness," "embodiment," "circularity" and "invariance." In doing so, the aim is to further describe and exemplify how his proposal is indeed radical.

« 1 » First of all, I would like to thank all the commentators for their productive contributions and suggestions, as well as their critical questions and clarifications of how to understand and potentially develop Francisco Varela's radical proposal. It is the variety of these fruitful commentaries that makes it possible to further clarify three key issues of my target article, i.e., questions concerning "radical openness," degrees of embodiment, and the level of circularity and invariance in the phenomenological interview framework.

Openness: Why and how?

« 2 » The first issue I would like to address concerns the reason why there is a need for "radical openness" in cognitive science, and whether this openness is radical at all. Marek McGann highlights that my re-emphasis of openness in terms of Varela's radical proposal resonates within current psychological science, where a "loud" and a "quiet" form of crisis is said to exist (§3). The former refers to a crisis of *reliability* in the research practice, which exists due to perverse incentives structures (§§1–5, 7). This crisis is, however, so loud that it goes beyond psychological science and echoes within science in general (see Martiny, Pedersen & Birkegaard 2016). The quieter crisis pertains to the *validity* of psychological science and its theoretical foundation and attitude (§§4, 6, 8). As McGann emphasizes, this quiet crisis is not new, since it has been raised on several occasions throughout the history of psychological science (§9).

« 3 » The point McGann makes is that the (current, practice-oriented) loud and (historical, theory-oriented) quiet crises

are interrelated, since the theories we use are a product of our practice (§10). This is the same point made by Varela (1996: 346f), who states that we cannot deal with the theoretical issues of cognitive science (quiet crisis) if we do not deal with the practical issues (loud crisis), but that the reverse relation applies as well. I argue that to do so, we need to radically (re)open cognitive science, as proposed by Varela.

« 4 » McGann, by contrast, points out that Varela's proposal is not as radical as I claim. With regard to, for example, a plea for "opening up the lab" in cognitive science, ecological psychologists, Gibsonians (§11), scholars coming from biological science (§§12f), many current psychologists (§16), and enactive theorists (§15) would not find this radical or new. This point is also made by Allan Køster (§§19f).

« 5 » Whether a proposal is radical depends, of course, on what you compare it to. Varela would be much more radical if compared to a traditional cognitivist than if compared to an ecological psychologist, Gibsonian, or enactive theorist. That being said, however, I still find Varela's proposal radical, even when compared to the latter three. This relates to what openness means for how we do cognitive science and thereby connects to Simon Høffding's commentary. The first question (Q1) he raises is: how open should (cognitive) science strive to be? More specifically, can this openness go too far and compromise academic virtues (§7) and theoretical monodisciplinary rigor (§§12f)?

« 6 » I agree with Høffding's surmise that I do not opt for complete openness (§8), which comes at the expense of academic and theoretical rigor. I also agree with him that I understand radical openness as the interplay between the first-, second-, and third- person perspective (ibid). In relation to this interplay, Høffding asks a second question (Q2): how many scientists should conduct open (cognitive) science and open themselves to master the techniques and theories of all three perspectives? Høffding takes my position to be that individual researchers should be able to take up the three perspectives by themselves, which he takes to be too demanding (§§9f, 13), although he recognizes that it's worth the effort (§11). Instead, Høffding presents a practical solution

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